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Summary 
This paper explores the influence that financial sector deficits have on a country’s export 
performance under trade liberalization. It argues that under such circumstances, financial 
constraints are particularly damaging because trade liberalization increases the demand for 
finance both in the export sector and for investment. The paper aims to identify the most 
relevant factors in determining how financial constraints are likely to hinder the export 
performance of a particular country. Based on these factors, the paper outlines a research 
scheme that once applied to a particular country, provides a detailed understanding of the 
financial needs that should be addressed during trade liberalization. 
The analysis of the experiences of three African countries – Kenya, Uganda and Ghana – 
that undertook substantial trade liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s reveals the following 
key findings: 
• Financial constraints unevenly affected the various sectors and producer subgroups 
within the economy. Such constraints therefore not only affected the country’s overall 
trade performance, but also influenced the composition of the export portfolio and the 
participation of producer groups in the export sector. 
• Export is a multilayered process determined by production, transaction and competi-
tiveness. Financial constraints can be present in each of the three layers and can se-
verely hamper a sector’s export performance even if there is a sufficient supply of fi-
nance in the other layers. 
• Investment support schemes or alternative sources of finance, such as FDI or integra-
tion into a global value chain, can be partial substitutes for weaknesses of the domestic 
financial system. However, they are typically only available for certain sectors and 
producer groups. 
The research scheme incorporates these insights in seeking to identify potential financial 
constraints in countries planning to liberalize trade. The aim is to improve the outcome of 
future trade liberalization projects by improving the targeting and timing of supplementary 
programs meant to overcome financial constraints. 
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1 Introduction 
Trade liberalization has been broadly prescribed by economists and development organi-
zations as a path to economic development. Although there is a strong theoretical case and 
some encouraging examples for the beneficial impacts of trade on economic development, 
not all countries’ experiences with trade liberalization have been positive. Particularly, the 
anticipated increase in a country’s exports, both in terms of overall value and portfolio 
diversification, has often failed to materialize. Apparently, trade liberalization works bet-
ter for some countries than for others. There are a number of reasons given for this, one of 
which is that a country’s export performance can be severely hindered by deficits of its 
financial system. However, although most researchers would agree that there is some link 
between financial development and export performance, few details are known so far 
about the impacts of financial constraints for the special case of a country undergoing sub-
stantial trade liberalization. Exploring the channels through which financial constraints 
impact on an economy under trade liberalization provides the opportunity to improve the 
outcome of future liberalization projects by complementing them with targeted measures 
to overcome the most damaging financial constraints. 
This paper contributes to this body of research by analyzing the experiences of three Afri-
can countries – Kenya, Uganda and Ghana – that undertook substantial trade liberalization 
during the period from 1980 to 2000. This work does not claim to be a cookbook for tack-
ling financial constraints. It aims instead to develop a research scheme to identify how 
financial constraints are likely to hinder the export performance of a particular country and 
to gain a detailed understanding of financial needs that should be addressed under trade 
liberalization. The idea is to develop a precise picture of what has to be achieved, which 
can then be used as a yardstick for the design of policy measures for financial develop-
ment. 
As this paper represents a first step into a large field of research, its scope is limited in a 
number of ways. First, it is focused on growth and diversification of exports as a measure 
of success of trade liberalization. Of course, liberalization impacts on other indicators such 
as poverty ratios or GDP growth, which are at least as important. However, they are influ-
enced by a vast number of additional variables independent of trade, which would greatly 
complicate the analysis. Second, only merchandise exports are analyzed while exports of 
services are ignored. This is simply in order not to overstretch the analytical scope given 
that financial constraints in the service sector are very different from those affecting mer-
chandise exports. Third, all case studies are from African countries. This does not neces-
sarily mean that results are inapplicable to other regions, but they certainly reflect condi-
tions typical of Africa. 
The first section reviews the literature on finance-export issues in order to provide an 
overview of the links between them that have so far been identified. Based on this, the 
general case is made for why financial constraints are of particular importance under trade 
liberalization. The next three sections are delineated by country with three subdivisions 
each. The first subdivision describes the country’s trade performance under liberalization. 
The second subdivision describes its level of financial development and analyzes the 
strengths and weaknesses of its financial sector. Lastly, it describes the existing schemes 
for export finance that have been set up by the government and donors. The third subdivi-
sion analyzes the effects that financial issues had on trade performance and draws general 
Erik von Uexküll 
4 German Development Institute 
lessons from them. The conclusion brings these findings together in order to develop rec-
ommendations for future liberalization projects. 
2 Finance-export links and their role under trade liberalization 
In general, the literature on trade and finance indicates two lines of argument for why 
trade liberalization would increase the significance of financial constraints. Henceforth, 
these two will be referred to as the trade-finance and the investment arguments. 
The trade-finance argument is based on the idea that producing and marketing an export 
product requires more financial services than does domestic production and marketing. 
There is a broad body of literature concerning this link. For example, Finger and Schuknecht 
(1999) identify four reasons why export needs financial institutions: first, to provide credit 
to bridge the time period between production and payment, which tends to be longer for 
exporting producers than for domestically operating firms; second, to provide efficient and 
safe financial instruments for international payments; third, as a source of various kinds of 
market information which otherwise would be more costly to obtain; and fourth, to pro-
vide insurance against trade related risks like transport hazards, currency volatility, and 
the danger of non-compliance of foreign business partners. 
Using a standard gravity trade model, Becker and Greenberg (2003) find a significant rela-
tion between financial development and export performance. They explain this with ex-
porters’ higher up-front costs for market finding, product and market development, and 
the establishment of distribution networks, which often have to be financed externally. 
For the case of Indonesia, Aswicahyono and Feridhanusetyawan (2004) state that one rea-
son for the strong decline of exports during the crisis in 1998 was that the collapse of the 
banking system deprived potential exporters of the means to obtain trade financing. This 
shows how problems in the financial system can hinder even the performance of exporters 
who are already established in international markets. 
The trade finance argument combines these findings with the idea that the main aim of 
trade liberalization is to increase exports. Thus, if exports require finance and liberaliza-
tion increases exports, it follows that the demand for export related finance is going to rise 
under trade liberalization. This is essentially the main point of the trade finance argument. 
The investment argument is based on two ideas. First, financial systems are important for 
investment because their basic function is to channel people’s savings to promising in-
vestment projects and thus enable entrepreneurs to make profitable investments which 
they cannot fund from their own resources. Second, trade liberalization increases the de-
mand for investment in a country because it changes relative prices and thus starts a pro-
cess of economic readjustment. Following this line of argument, Liebig et al. (2005) em-
phasize the significance of domestic financial market deficits as a supply side constraint 
under trade liberalization. They argue that in opening up its markets, a country will usu-
ally experience both a contraction of its import competing industry and an expansion of its 
export industry. However, if a country’s financial sector is underdeveloped, this may se-
verely constrain its export expansion because entrepreneurs find it difficult to finance the 
investments necessary to take advantage of newly arising export opportunities. This con-
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cern is supported by Warcziarg and Welch’s (2003) finding that starting two years after 
liberalization, there tends to be a significant growth in investment rates. As these invest-
ments must somehow be financed, there is reason to expect an increased demand for ex-
ternal finance in the years following trade liberalization. 
In summary, both the trade-finance and the investment arguments indicate that demand for 
financial services is likely to increase in a country after trade liberalization. Experience 
shows that supply of these services is very limited in most developing countries and usu-
ally concentrated in a few sectors. There is thus reason to believe that trade liberalization 
will aggravate the shortage of financial services, which in turn is likely to hamper the an-
ticipated improvement of a country’s export performance. 
3 The case of Kenya 
3.1 Trade history 
During the 1980s Kenya had a per capita GDP level around 350 US $. Growth was low in 
the first half of the 1980s leading to an overall decline in per capita GDP. It improved dur-
ing the second half of the decade, bringing per capita GDP up to 379 US $ in 1990. The 
share of merchandise exports to GDP fell from 17.1 % (1980) to 12.1 % (1990). Macro-
economic conditions were unstable with high inflation and a twin deficit of both the fiscal 
budget and the current account. Exports comprised mainly agricultural products and raw 
materials, with tea and coffee together accounting for between 37 % (1981) and 63 % 
(1985) of total merchandise exports. Merchandise export growth rates were volatile, rang-
ing from +25.3 % (1986) to –19.9 % (1987) and reflecting the country’s high dependence 
on world market commodity prices. Overall, merchandise exports decreased by 17 % be-
tween 1980 and 1990. The share of manufactured exports was constantly below 15 % dur-
ing the 1980s. The trade regime included unweighted average tariff rates of around 40 % 
and a number of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) further hindering imports. 
In 1990, the Export Development Project (EDP), sponsored by the World Bank, instituted 
substantial reforms of the existing trade regime. The reforms were implemented by 1993 
and included incentives and support programs for exporters. The average unweighted tar-
iff rate was lowered from 43.7 % in 1990 to 22 % in 1995 and remained below 20 % dur-
ing the following years. Most NTBs were dismantled and the tariff system was simplified. 
Kenya became a founding member of the WTO. Additionally, the government undertook 
market oriented reforms such as reducing the power of marketing boards for agricultural 
products, restructuring state owned enterprises, reducing the fiscal deficit, increasing the 
emphasis on macroeconomic stability, and liberalizing the exchange rate. (WTO 2000; 
World Bank 1995a; Onjala 2002.) 
Between 1990 and 1996, Kenya’s merchandise exports grew constantly at an average an-
nual ratio of 11.6 %. This was regardless of the fact that coffee and tea exports remained 
volatile and both decreased in the first years after liberalization. This overall growth was 
made possible by the increasing role in the export portfolio of other agricultural exports 
such as vegetables, fruit, cut flowers, and fish and by a strong increase in manufactured 
exports, which grew at an average annual ratio of 30 % between 1990 and 1996. Conse-
quently, the share of tea and coffee in overall merchandise exports decreased from 51 % in 
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1990 to 31 % in 1996. The current account balance improved and became positive in the 
years 1993 and 1994. However, the increase in exports did not immediately translate into 
GDP growth. The early 1990s saw very low or even negative GDP growth and it was not 
until 1994/1995 that the country again experienced significant growth. Accordingly, the 
export sector’s importance for the economy strongly increased, with the merchandise ex-
ports / GDP ratio growing from 12.1 % (1990) to 22.3 % (1996). 
In 1996/1997, natural disaster (mainly El Niño) hit the country and concerns about gov-
ernance and social problems undermined investor confidence (WTO 2000). GDP growth 
declined again. Merchandise exports began to fall slightly, but constantly, over the next 
years. This was driven by a sharp decline in coffee and most other commodity exports 
with tea exports remaining volatile, but basically around their initial level. While the de-
cline in coffee exports corresponded with a reduction of coffee production due to the de-
struction of plantations by El Niño, other commodity exports such as fruit and fish de-
clined even though production levels remained constant or even increased. The next sub-
division provides a possible explanation by relating this situation to financial constraints. 
With its export level stagnating well below the import level, Kenya ran current account 
deficits again after 1995. 
3.2 Financial sector development 
Compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries with similar GDP levels, Kenya’s fi-
nancial sector is relatively well developed. The level of private sector credit to GDP has 
been fairly constant between 29 % and 35 % during the 1980s and 1990s, corresponding 
to an annual per capita credit level between 95 and 123 US $. Although a vast number of 
banks and other financial institutions are operating in Kenya, competition in the financial 
sector is relatively low because markets are segmented and most institutions focus on 
business with a small number of established large scale clients. A deficient legal and insti-
tutional framework further aggravates inefficiency. After the interest rate was liberalized 
in 1991, the lending interest rate grew much faster than the deposit rate. This high interest 
spread, which reflects excessive transaction costs, makes credit expensive and deposits 
unprofitable thereby depressing the savings rate (Atieno 2001; Beck and Fuchs 2004; 
Ngugi 2001; FSAP 2005). Generally, the bigger a business is, the more likely it is to have 
access to credit (Bigsten et al. 2003; Isaksson 2002a; Isaksson 2002b). On the other hand, 
access to credit and other financial services is often lacking in rural areas and for small 
and medium enterprises (Kariuki 1995). The limited and more expensive services of in-
formal lenders are only a weak substitute for formal financial services (Isaksson 2002c). 
Macroeconomic instability, namely inflation and high fiscal deficits, threatened the Ken-
yan financial system throughout the 1980s. The first part of the 1990s saw substantial pro-
gress in balancing the fiscal deficit and controlling inflation. However, this trend was re-
versed in 1996 when the government had to take up additional credit on the domestic capi-
tal market in order to finance relief programs for natural disaster victims. This, combined 
with a tight monetary policy and a decreasing inflow of foreign capital, led to an increase 
in interest rates and worsened the credit shortage for private enterprises (WTO 2000). 
Kenya has some financial institutions designed for the promotion of exports. The World 
Bank funded Kenya Exporters Assistance Scheme (KEAS) gives grants to small and me-
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dium producers of non-traditional exports. USAID also provides financial support to ex-
port oriented small and medium scale firms in manufacturing and agri-processing, while 
the Central Bank of Kenya has a rediscount scheme for commercial trade credits. Finally, 
government owned financial institutions such as the Industrial Development Bank previ-
ously promoted export oriented investment by giving below market rate loans, but have 
recently stopped this practice (ibd.). 
3.3 Finance-export links 
Generally, trade liberalization in Kenya led to an improvement of its export performance 
in terms of both absolute export values and portfolio diversification. Also, Kenya could 
reduce its dependence on world market commodity prices by increasing the share of 
manufactured exports. Unfortunately, this positive development came to an end primarily 
because of governance issues and external shocks, namely natural disasters. Nevertheless, 
trade liberalization in Kenya can be seen as a limited success. 
The Kenyan experience provides several hints on the relation between financial sector 
development and the outcome of trade liberalization. Generally, a comparatively high 
level of financial sector development corresponds with a relatively positive liberalization 
experience in terms of trade diversification and export growth. There are of course a num-
ber of other factors apart from financial issues that played an important role in Kenya’s 
relative success. 
The history of the World Bank sponsored support mechanisms for exporters under the 
EDP shows that there were financial constraints hindering export performance during the 
Kenyan trade liberalization. In its performance audit report (World Bank 1995a), the Bank 
states that while the success of other measures such as the creation of an Export Process-
ing Zone remained below expectations, the response to its KEAS was overwhelming. The 
program proved extremely successful in providing a springboard to firms that once export-
ing could operate without further assistance in international markets. The program’s ex-
perience demonstrates that there is a high potential for successful export performance in 
Kenya, which is hindered by financial constraints. However, as the program’s resources 
are limited, most of this potential will remain unexploited if the financial system does not 
develop to provide exporters with up-front financing on a commercial basis. 
Further details of the adjustment process contribute to a more in depth picture of financial 
constraints in Kenya. With respect to manufacturing exports, Söderbom (2000) finds that 
in Kenya, export performance is determined by micro-data related to particular firms 
rather than industry specific variables as neoclassical trade theory would predict. Among 
these variables, a firm’s size measured in terms of its number of employees has a signifi-
cant positive influence on the probability that the firm is engaged in exporting (Söderbom 
2000, Teal 1999). One explanation for this is that fixed up-front costs for transport, infor-
mation and market research create economies of scale advantage for bigger firms.1 A sec-
                                                 
1 It should be noted that this is not necessarily the case as these up-front cost factors are linked to the 
process of exporting rather than the production of the export goods. Thus, if export goods are produced 
on a small scale but many producers cooperate in the process of exporting, they do not face this econo-
mies of scale disadvantage. 
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ond explanation is the above cited finding that bigger firms in Kenya have easier access to 
credit. Meanwhile, small and medium firms willing to become exporters tend to be con-
strained by their inability to find external finance to make the investments or get the work-
ing capital necessary to engage in export activities. This leads to a discrimination against 
small and medium producers and thus lowers both overall exports and the diversification 
of the export portfolio as only goods produced on a large scale are exportable. 
Second, Kenya’s experience shows that even if the financial system is relatively well de-
veloped, access to credit can vary significantly between different economic sectors. Given 
the concentration of banking services in urban regions, there is a strong bias in credit 
availability against agriculture. For example, in 1998, agriculture received only 5.35 % of 
total credit to the private sector. The problem is aggravated by the general bias against 
small lenders because most agricultural production in Kenya is small-scale. Thus, farmers 
are unable to get credit to finance investment in inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, 
and land preparation. This severely hampers their ability to improve productivity, increase 
their yields, and fully benefit from arising export opportunities (Nyoro et al. 2001). The 
fact that after trade liberalization, some non-traditional agricultural exports such as fruit 
and vegetables have grown significantly anyway can be explained by what Muendo and 
Tschirley (2004) call the “dualistic nature” (p. 30) of these sectors. They show that while a 
relatively small group of commercial farmers and well organized groups of small scale 
farmers compete successfully in international markets, the far bigger group of unorganized 
small scale farmers produces entirely for domestic markets. Although these small scale 
farmers produce the same fruits and vegetables, they are unable to meet the high standards 
of price and quality necessary to compete in international markets. Thus, successful export 
performance is limited to a small group of producers who are able to make necessary in-
vestments, either because they can rely on their own financial resources or because they 
have access to external finance. Other producers are excluded from these market opportu-
nities due to their financial constraints. 
Another interesting phenomenon with respect to the role of the financial sector in Kenya’s 
export performance is the effect of the 1996/1997 downturn. As it has been discussed ear-
lier, exports of almost all commodities decreased in the years following the natural disas-
ter and the downturn of the economy it provoked. In the case of coffee, this was because 
of a decrease in production due to the destruction of plants and fields. However, the down-
turn also affected commodities with unchanged or even growing output ratios, which sug-
gests a general shift back to an inward orientation of the economy. There are a number of 
possible explanations for this, among them governance problems and the destruction of 
infrastructure which increased transport costs. However, there is also a finance related 
explanation to this phenomenon. As it has been pointed out, the government borrowed 
heavily on the domestic capital market to deal with the consequences of the disaster. This 
led to a rise in the interest rate and further aggravated the finance gap in the private sector. 
A decline in Kenyan exports is thus what one would expect in accordance with the find-
ings of Aswicahyono and Feridhanusetyawan (2004) that a decrease in the amount of 
credit available for exporting activities can significantly depress a country’s exports. 
The example of Kenya holds an important lesson for financial development with respect to 
trade liberalization. First, producers’ access to credit is an important factor in determining 
export performance of a particular subgroup of the economy. This holds true both for dif-
ferent sectors and with respect to different firm sizes and locations and has an important 
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implication for the outcome of trade liberalization. Financial constraints which concern 
one sector or group of producers more than others will have an influence on the determi-
nation of a country’s export portfolio and the group of producers operating in the export 
sector. However, this country’s export portfolio reflects the distortions of its financial sec-
tor rather than its comparative advantage or the competitiveness of exporters under market 
conditions. Thus, it is likely to lead to an efficiency loss in terms of a suboptimal resource 
allocation in export activities. To avoid these losses, a country would have to enable its 
financial sector to provide exporters with unbiased access to financial services, which 
would then trigger an adjustment process of the export portfolio towards comparative ad-
vantage and maximum competitiveness. Given that each readjustment of the export sector 
involves transaction costs, this makes an argument for fixing financial sector distortions 
along with trade liberalization. Otherwise, a country might find itself in a situation where 
it has to undergo two painful adjustment processes of its export sector, one after the other, 
and suffer unnecessary efficiency losses in the meantime. 
4 The case of Uganda 
4.1 Trade history 
During the early 1980s the Ugandan economy was characterized by a per capita GDP 
around 170 US $, unstable, sometimes negative GDP growth rates, and an export sector 
that depended entirely on coffee. The country’s strong dependence on coffee prices made 
its export earnings highly dependent on both the world market price for coffee and the 
harvest yields of its coffee producers. Other export activities were strongly discouraged by 
bad and inconsistent policy, including highly inefficient state owned monopolies for pro-
cessing and trade, state administered agricultural prices, and a high level of tariff protec-
tion (Morrissey and Rudaheranwa 1998). 
In 1987, the government adopted an ambitious reform agenda called Economic Recovery 
Program (ERP) which was supported by the IMF and the World Bank. This program in-
cluded privatization of state owned enterprises and marketing boards, the liberalization of 
prices and interest rates, and a gradual simplification and reduction of trade barriers. Also, 
Uganda became a founding member of the WTO. This coincided with the ongoing politi-
cal stabilization of the country following Museveni’s take-over of power in 1985/86, fur-
ther contributing to economic recovery and growth. 
The reforms had an almost immediate positive effect on the country’s macroeconomic 
performance. GDP growth rates went up to levels around 5 % and significantly above in 
some years. Inflation remained high during the first liberalization years, but decreased 
after 1990 and has been down to one digit levels since 1993. 
With respect to the export sector, it is more difficult to identify a direct impact of liberali-
zation. The trade regime was liberalized in subsequent steps between 1987 and 1996. Av-
erage nominal tariff rates declined from 30 % (1986) to 17.1 % (1994) to 10 % (1998) 
while NTBs were completely removed. The tariff and licensing system was simplified and 
export taxation abolished (WTO 1995; WTO 2001a; Collier 1997). The explicit aim of the 
ERP was to increase both the value of exports and the diversification of the export portfo-
lio. 
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While the value share of non-coffee exports in total exports rose significantly from 1987 
to 1993, this was mainly due to a strong decline in world coffee prices. Total merchandise 
exports fell from 436 million US $ in 1986 to 142 million US $ in 1993. Nevertheless, 
there was also some increase in non-coffee exports, namely tea, tobacco, fish, sesame, 
cotton, beans and maize in the years 1990–1993. This reflected large increases in produc-
tion of these commodities in the years directly after liberalization. However, while tradi-
tional exports of tea and tobacco rose in line with increases in production, export growth 
in non-traditional sectors such as maize, beans and fish usually remained behind overall 
production growth in these sectors. This indicates that these sectors’ export performance 
was constrained by factors affecting the process of exporting rather than the production of 
exportable goods. 
While output growth of non-traditional crops was mainly due to an extension in the land 
used for plantation, growth in tea, cotton and tobacco production resulted from long term 
improvements of yields which indicates improved productivity in these sectors. 
In 1993 Ugandan merchandise exports began to grow tremendously and by 1996 had 
reached a level of 587 million US $, more than four times its 1992 level. Again, this was 
mainly driven by the coffee sector and made possible by a fortunate combination of rising 
world market coffee prices and extraordinarily high plantation yields. However, there was 
only a minor increase in the area used for coffee plantation and the increase in yields 
turned out to be a short-term phenomenon, driven by good climate conditions in these 
years rather than improvements in agricultural productivity. Unfortunately, other relevant 
agricultural exports declined in 1994 and 1995. While the traditional export commodities 
tea, tobacco and cotton recovered shortly thereafter and again began to grow, maize, ses-
ame seeds and beans exports, which had only just begun after the reforms, kept falling and 
returned to their initial marginal role in the export portfolio. This is even more surprising 
given that production levels of all three crops kept rising substantially except for one bad 
harvest in 1997 brought on by a drought followed by El Nino. Some of the declines in 
non-traditional agricultural exports were compensated for by an increase in other sectors, 
mainly strengthening flower exports. Nevertheless, the growth of the non-traditional ex-
port sector, which had been slow, but constant since 1987, came to a halt in 1996 and has 
been moderately falling since. Combined with a constant decline in coffee prices since 
1997, which has only partly been compensated by increases in the traditional exports of 
tea and tobacco, this has led to a decline in Ugandan merchandise exports from 555 mil-
lion US $ in 1997 to 443 million US $ in 2002. Although exports of manufactures, mainly 
processed agricultural products, rose slightly following liberalization, they still play a very 
limited role for Uganda. 
Generally, liberalization had a positive effect on Ugandan exports. The share of non-
traditional exports increased and it is very likely that exports would be at an even lower 
level today if the dependence on coffee prices had not at least been somewhat reduced. 
However, the decline of total merchandise exports after 1997 has revealed that the coun-
try’s dependence on coffee is still very high and that its capacity to improve performance 
in other sectors is limited. Surprisingly, the data presented above show that often this is 
not due to a supply problem as production of many non traditional exports has risen while 
exports stagnated or declined. Correspondingly, GDP growth of Uganda was on average 
higher during the period 1987-2002 than export growth rates, which is contrary to what 
one would expect following trade liberalization. This can be explained by the high trans-
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action costs born by Ugandan exporters. Transport costs are significant due to the coun-
try’s landlocked position and miserable infrastructure. Man-made barriers such as ineffi-
cient custom procedures cause further delays and costs and thus aggravate the problem. 
Furthermore, a survey conducted by the Export Policy Analysis Unit of the Ugandan Min-
istry of Finance and Economic Planning (EPAU 1995) revealed that most exporters name 
inadequate market information and uncompetitive prices as their main problems. The lat-
ter finding can be linked to the discovery that only agricultural sectors such as tea and to-
bacco, which managed to increase their  yields, reached a sustainable growth of exports. 
Other sectors such as maize, beans and sesame, which grew mainly through an extension 
of the land harvested for production, were unable to reach a significant role in the coun-
try’s export portfolio. Apparently, their level of productivity was insufficient to success-
fully compete internationally. 
4.2 Financial sector development 
Uganda’s financial sector is small and underdeveloped. The annual per capita level of 
credit to the private sector was around 4 US $ during the early 1980s and then rose sub-
stantially to 22 US $ in 2000. This means an increase of the credit/GDP ratio from around 
3 % to 6.5 % which is still very low, even compared to African standards. Furthermore, 
Uganda’s currency/M2 ratio is among the highest in Africa, indicating that most money is 
held cash and not in banking accounts. Commercial banks are the predominant actors in 
the Ugandan financial system. Bank branch penetration is at the very low rate of 130,000 
people per branch and there is hardly any access to banks for people in rural areas. Also, 
Ugandan banks tend to focus on low-risk business with a few long-term clients. Credit for 
market entrants, especially for those engaged in emerging and insecure businesses such as 
export of non-traditional commodities, is very hard to find. Agriculture, despite its pre-
dominant role in Ugandan GDP and especially in exports, receives only 10 % of total pri-
vate sector lending. Although Uganda has some fairly well-developed microfinance insti-
tutions, their supply of credit is relatively small compared to the needs of small-scale pro-
ducers. As in Kenya, interest rates for commercial lending are driven up by high interest 
spreads due to high risk perceptions, inefficiencies, and a lack of competition in the finan-
cial sector (IMF 2003a). 
The so called Export Finance Scheme administered by the Bank of Uganda (BOU) guar-
anteed funding for 195 non traditional export contracts between 1991 and 2000. Credit 
was guaranteed for both working capital needs during shipment and investment in export 
infrastructure such as warehouses and packaging facilities. The program was renamed the 
Export Credit Guarantee Scheme (ECGS) and upgraded with the support of USAID in 
2001. The idea was to encourage participating private banks to provide exporters with 
credit by taking over part of the credit risk (WTO 2001a). In 2003, an evaluation report of 
the project stated that “the development objective of the ECGS – to finance increased vol-
umes of non-traditional exports - is in the process of being realized. This has been espe-
cially true of grains, beans, and flowers.” (SPEED 2003, 6). Although a general positive 
trend in 2002 for the export commodities mentioned is not unambiguously supported by 
other sources of data such as the FAO statistical database, the report’s findings seem rea-
sonable in stating that the ECGS has indeed contributed to successful export business in a 
number of cases. Its limited effect on overall non-traditional exports is certainly due to its 
relatively limited funds: in June 2002 the fund was about 1,8 million US $ guarantying a 
Erik von Uexküll 
12 German Development Institute 
total amount of about 3,4 million US $ of credit. However, the experiences of the project 
reveal some interesting hints as to the importance of finance in the Ugandan export sector, 
which will be discussed below. 
In 1995, an Export Promotion Fund was launched at the BOU with the support of the 
European Investment Bank. This fund gives interest free loans to exporters for market 
studies, staff training, and representation abroad. The European Investment Banks also 
provides a loan scheme for investment (WTO 2001a). 
4.3 Finance-export links 
The Ugandan experience shows that the determination of export performance is multilay-
ered. It depends on the supply of potential export goods, the transaction between suppliers 
in the country and their clients abroad, and their competitiveness on world markets. 
The supply side reaction to liberalization in terms of an increase in the provision of ex-
portable goods has been relatively strong in the case of Uganda. With the exception of 
coffee, all relevant agricultural export commodities grew significantly in terms of output 
during the post-liberalization years. However, this did not translate into sustained export 
growth in all cases. One striking characteristic of sectors with sustained export growth 
such as tea and tobacco is that yields were substantially improved in these sectors which 
indicates increased productivity and thus more competitiveness. On the other hand, output 
of commodities such as maize, beans and sesame was raised mainly through an extension 
of the land harvested without substantial gains in productivity. These sectors export per-
formance, although promising in the first years after liberalization, remained weak and 
unsustainable. 
An explanation for this is that productivity gains are indispensable in order to reduce costs 
and remain competitive in international markets. As productivity gains are usually 
achieved through investment, which often has to be financed externally, this finding fur-
ther supports the importance of financial markets under trade liberalization. As pointed out 
above, access to credit is often even more limited for producers in non-traditional sectors 
because banks tend to have a restricted circle of long-term clients and are reluctant to 
work with new clients in young business sectors. Thus, financial constraints in these sec-
tors were especially strong and prevented them from improving their productivity and de-
veloping a stable position in world markets. Other sectors had much more positive experi-
ences. For example, the tobacco sector in Uganda benefited from an existing vertically 
integrated export scheme operated by British American Tobacco (BAT) which buys al-
most the entire tobacco production of the country and supports local farmers in improving 
their productivity. Thus, tobacco planters could improve their yields regardless of existing 
credit constraints. Apparently, financial constraints are not just relevant for a sectors out-
put response to liberalization, but also for its ability to remain competitive in world mar-
kets. Differences in terms of demand for and access to external finance can thus also occur 
and affect a sector’s export performance on the competitiveness layer. 
The most important layer of export determination with respect to financial constraints in 
Uganda turned out to be the transaction between suppliers and their clients abroad. High 
transaction costs due to bad transport and communication infrastructure as well as man-
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made barriers constitute a mayor problem for Ugandan exporters. This is related to finan-
cial sector issues because it raises the up-front costs exporters face and thus their demand 
for trade finance. The positive experiences of the ECGS show that there is indeed a high 
demand for trade finance among Ugandan exporters, which is not satisfied by the coun-
try’s financial system. It also proves that overcoming these financial constraints can sig-
nificantly improve the country’s export performance. Of course, access to finance cannot 
substitute necessary investments in transport and communication infrastructure and the 
reduction of man made barriers. However, it can help to reduce the depressing effects that 
these obstacles have on a country’s export performance. Thus, finance also has an impor-
tant role to play in the transaction layer of export determination and financial constraints 
on this layer can be just as damaging as those affecting the production and the competi-
tiveness layer. 
In summary, the analysis of the Ugandan liberalization experience reveals that since de-
termination of export performance is multilayered, finance is needed on several levels in 
order to secure a successful export performance. Credit is often required to (a) expand 
production in export sectors, (b) improve productivity in export sectors in order to main-
tain competitiveness in world markets, and (c) overcome financing gaps during the trans-
action between producers and clients. As each layer has the potential to severely hinder a 
sector’s exports, bottlenecks and financial constraints on all levels have to be considered 
at the same time. 
5 The case of Ghana 
5.1 Trade history 
By the early 1980s, Ghana’s economy had already been declining for decades with per 
capita GDP falling since the 1960s and reaching a level of around 200 US $ in the 1980s. 
The country’s exports underwent an even sharper decline during these years. This was 
mainly driven by falling production levels of cocoa, by far Ghana’s most important export 
good, and mining exports, mainly gold and diamonds. The real overvaluation of the Gha-
naian currency, driven by high inflation rates, hindered the competitiveness of exports and 
encouraged smuggling through the neighboring country Côte d’Ivoire (Federal Research 
Division 2004). 
In 1983, the government launched a World Bank and IMF supported ERP which included 
elements of both liberalization and stabilization. The exchange rate was devalued several 
times and then liberalized in subsequent steps. The tax system was reformed, the tax base 
was broadened, and subsidies were reduced. Interest rates and prices were liberalized with 
the exception of the cocoa sector, where producer prices continue to be set by the Ghana 
Cocoa Board (COCOBOD). The trade regime was streamlined, most quantitative restric-
tions removed and import licensing abolished (World Bank 1995b)). Unweighted average 
tariff rates declined from 43.3 % in 1982 to 17 % in 1988. Ghana is a founding member of 
the WTO. 
The reforms had an almost immediate impact on GDP growth which since then has been 
constantly positive at rates between 8.6 % (1984) and 3.3 % (1990 and 1994). Merchan-
dise exports remained volatile, but generally grew at an average annual ratio of 7.6 % after 
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1983. This was driven by three factors. First, growing cocoa export earnings reflected the 
slow, but constant growth of cocoa output. This was made possible by both growing yields 
and the cultivation of additional land. The state-run marketing board COCOBOD with its 
monopoly for exporting cocoa and its authority to set producer prices has often been criti-
cized as a major impediment to cocoa exports. For example, Teal (2002) argues that in-
centives for growth in cocoa exports have been substantially reduced by the fact that pro-
ducer prices were set at a level way below world market prices. This is indeed a major 
problem which the Ghanaian authorities have recently started to address (WTO 2001b). 
On the other hand, COCOBOD has contributed to the realization of productivity gains in 
cocoa planting by providing research results as well as improved plants at subsidized 
prices. It also organizes the marketing and exporting of cocoa (German Embassy Accra 
2005). Aside from cocoa, Ghana has developed only few other agricultural exports in 
relevant scope. The most important of these are pineapples and cashew nuts, which have 
undergone slow but constant growth in both production and export since 1983. 
The second important factor in export growth was a strong increase in traditional mining 
exports, mainly gold. Third, the non-traditional export sector strongly increased its export 
share from 3 % in 1986 to 19 % in 1998. Processed and semi-processed food such as 
canned tuna and sliced pineapples, as well as timber products contributed the biggest share 
to this growth (WTO 2001b). 
5.2 Financial sector development 
In terms of financial development, Ghana is in many ways similar to Uganda. From a very 
low level of 2.85 US $ in 1983, per capita credit to the private sector rose to 35.5 US $ in 
2000, reflecting a growth of private credit to GDP from 1.5 % to 14 %. This is still very 
low. The increase in credit was triggered by a variety of financial reforms including the 
liberalization of interest rates, the restructuring of banks, and the abolishment of the man-
datory channeling of credit to certain sectors. Although these reforms were successful in 
increasing overall levels of credit, they did not significantly increase the country’s level of 
financial deepening (Aryeetey et al. 1997). 
Ghana has a variety of financial institutions including a banking sector dominated by the 
state-owned Ghana Commercial Bank and three foreign owned banks (IMF 2003c). There 
are also several rural banks and a stock exchange. However, most of these institutions are 
underdeveloped, inefficient, and reach only a low share of the population. Bank penetra-
tion is relatively high in the region around the capital Accra, but often completely missing 
in rural areas. Rural banks, which were designed to overcome this problem, tend to focus 
on mobilizing rural savings, but are often reluctant to provide credit in rural areas (IMF 
2003b). Generally, there is a lack of competition in the Ghanaian banking system which 
leads to inefficiency and high transaction costs in allocating capital. One reason for this 
are the heavy financing needs of the government which have encouraged banks to invest 
in risk free treasury bills rather than to seek business with private sector clients. Govern-
ment borrowing has also put upward pressure on the interest rate, crowding out private 
borrowing (Brownbridge and Gockel 1996). Further, there are economies of scale effects 
in the banking system and high investment costs which deter new entrants (Buchs and 
Mathisen 2003). 
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In addition to high transaction costs in allocating capital, the savings rate in Ghana is very 
low. This is mainly because high inflation rates (often above the deposit interest rate) and 
overall macroeconomic instability have undermined confidence in financial institutions. 
This discourages people from holding financial assets even if they have the ability to save 
(Boehmer et al. 1994). The informal financial sector, although significant, is unable to fill 
the gap caused by the formal sector’s deficits. Thus, most firms in Ghana, especially small 
ones, lack access to credit and thus have to rely on their own savings and profits for work-
ing capital and investment (World Bank 1994) as well as for export operations (Buatsi 
2002). 
A number of institutions have been set up in Ghana to provide export promoting finance 
schemes. In 1990, the government founded the Export Finance Company (EFC) which 
provides loans, export insurance, and credit guarantees to non-traditional exporters. How-
ever, the EFC’s activities have been hampered by its weak financial resources and the sub-
stantial losses it incurred in the early 1990s. Since 1993 the World Bank has been funding 
an export credit refinance and guarantee facility which helps exporters to get short-term 
finance from participating banks. An Export Development and Investment Fund was set 
up by the government in 2001 to guarantee investment finance for exporters. It is funded 
by a tax on imports. There are also government funded agencies for micro and rural credit 
(WTO 2001b). 
5.3 Finance-export links 
As it has been pointed out above, Ghana’s export performance after trade liberalization 
was relatively successful both in terms of total merchandise exports and portfolio diversi-
fication. 
In comparing the Ghanaian experience to those of Kenya and Uganda, two observations 
stand out. First, Ghana was much more successful in increasing its traditional cocoa ex-
ports than Kenya and Uganda were with respect to their traditional exports of coffee and 
tea. This was the case regardless of the fact that small scale rural farmers and traders were 
just as credit constrained if not more so in Ghana than in Kenya and Uganda. Neverthe-
less, they were able to strongly increase their production levels both in terms of yields and 
in terms of area used for cocoa plantation and to find export markets for the additional 
production. Part of this success was made possible by the involvement of the state-run 
cocoa board. Despite its inefficiencies and its negative influence on the producer price for 
cocoa, COCOBOD helped farmers increase their productivity and organized the export of 
the cocoa harvest. Theoretically, COCOBOD did not do anything which a functioning 
market mechanism would not have been able to achieve. However, financial constraints 
due to market failures often hinder small scale producers’ attempts at investment even if 
their businesses have the potential to be profitable. The Ghanaian COCOBOD helped to 
overcome such “transaction failures” (Dorward et al. 2005) by providing farmers with 
subsidized investment goods. 
A second observation is related to the growth in both gold and other mining exports as 
well as non-traditional exports despite Ghana’s financial underdevelopment. Gold mining 
in Ghana is dominated by Ashanti Goldfields Company, a big partly state owned company 
which is also active in other African countries, and a number of foreign firms or joint-
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ventures with foreign participation. The expansion of the mining sector was mainly driven 
by its ability to attract foreign capital, either through equity participation in Ashanti Gold-
field (which has also received a number of World Bank credits) or through foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
With respect to non-traditional food exports such as canned tuna and pineapples, export 
growth was made possible by the country’s integration into global value chains with the 
participation of multinational companies. The tuna processing industry is dominated by 
Pioneer Food Cannery (PFC), which is owned by the US food company Heinz. This com-
pany established a vertically integrated production and export network complete with its 
own fishing vessels, processing facilities, transport, and exporting networks (Hoefter 
2001). Pineapples, both sliced and unprocessed, are produced and exported by big com-
mercial farms or smallholders organized in cooperatives. While the former often possess 
their own transport equipment and warehouses, most of the latter work with Farmapine 
Ghana Limited. This company, owned by the cooperatives and sponsored by the World 
Bank and the Ghanaian government, does not just organize the collection and transport of 
the products, but also provides technical and financial support to producers (Hagen et al. 
2004). Pineapples are then sold to and exported by foreign international food companies. 
For several reasons, integration into such global value chains lowers those firms’ depend-
ence on the domestic financial sector. In the case of a completely integrated vertical pro-
duction and export chain such as the tuna industry, a big multinational company, with its 
own strong capital resources and access to international financial markets, exerts itself in 
all three layers of export determination. 
However, even if the production and export chain is not entirely owned by a multinational, 
integration can still help producers and agents of transaction in the exporting country 
overcome domestic financial constraints. This is because integration reduces the transac-
tion costs associated with finance by providing lenders information and control mecha-
nisms about potential borrowers along the supply chain. In other words, a multinational 
fruit company which has an established business relationship with a local producer has a 
much more accurate picture of the viability of his investment plans than any bank. Thus, it 
can provide credit for a profitable investment at lower transaction costs than the bank. 
Thus, finance within the value chain can be channeled directly to the layer where it is 
needed most without transaction costs or the mediation of financial institutions. Also, it 
provides producers with a means to access foreign capital (Yow 2002). Finally, some mul-
tinational companies engaged in global value chains provide direct support to their local 
producers in the form of know-how and the provision of investment goods such as in the 
case of BAT and the Ugandan tobacco growers. 
With respect to timber processing, most companies involved are owned either by the gov-
ernment or by wealthy Ghanaian families with good connections abroad. These companies 
have been able to raise substantial equity capital and have received credit from both the 
World Bank and private foreign sources. 
The experience of Ghana indicates two paths with a potential to compensate for financial 
sector constraints in export performance. These are the provision of investment support 
and the ability to attract capital from sources independent of the domestic financial sector. 
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With respect to the former, there is reason to believe that mechanisms providing invest-
ment support in agriculture can compensate for a lack of financial sector development 
(Dorward / Kydd / Poulton 2005). Given the fact that financial development is a very long 
lasting process, this can be a promising shortcut to rural development. The apparent risk of 
this argument is that it could be used as a justification for excessive government involve-
ment and lead to maintaining state dominated marketing boards with strong monopoly 
positions. It has been sufficiently proven in the past that these tend to generate inefficiency 
and corruption which suppress producer prices and thus both investment and production. 
What is needed instead is a non-mandatory offer to farmers to participate in a jointly or-
ganized, but not necessarily state run distribution chain that provides cheap investment 
goods without the abusive powers of a state run marketing board. 
The case of Ghana has also shown that there are a number of possibilities for export sec-
tors to attract capital from sources independent of the domestic financial sector. The most 
important of these possibilities are FDI, integration into global value chains, equity capi-
tal, and foreign loans. However, they all have limitations. The literature on the advantages 
and disadvantages of FDI and the presence of multinational companies in developing 
countries is very extensive and shall not be reviewed here (see for example Cypher and 
Dietz 2003, chapter 14: Transnational corporations and economic development). For the 
purposes of this paper it is sufficient to state that FDI and global value chains do have a 
potential to help a country’s export sector to grow under trade liberalization, but that it is 
usually constrained both in its amount and in terms of target sectors as it mainly flows into 
the exploitation of natural resources and few manufacturing industries. Also, competition 
for FDI among developing countries is fierce and the loss of control over the exploitation 
of a country’s resources that goes along with foreign participation is often seen as prob-
lematic. One problem with export production within a global value chain is that it usually 
does not have strong links to the rest of the domestic economy. The opportunity to raise 
equity capital or attract foreign loans is restricted to persons or businesses with a strong 
commercial standing and very good business contacts. 
6 Conclusions 
Trade liberalization puts a country’s financial system under stress by raising the demand 
for credit to finance an increased level of both trade (trade-finance argument) and invest-
ment (investment argument.) Financial constraints therefore hamper a country’s ability to 
benefit from the increased value and diversification of exports that is expected to result 
from trade liberalization. However, the case studies presented in this paper show that the 
effect financial constraints have on export performance depends on a number of additional 
factors, which are usually specific to a particular sector or producer group. Also, financial 
constraints can occur in any of the three layers, production, transaction and competitive-
ness, that are crucial for a country’s export performance. Taking these findings together 
leads to a two-dimensional picture combining sector specific and layer specific factors that 
identifies where financial constraints are going to occur under trade liberalization. These 
can be summarized in the following matrix which should be completed for each individual 
sector considered relevant to a country’s export performance. 
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In each field, the financial needs of a specific sector in a specific layer can be identified. 
The factors which have proven to be crucial are given in the chart above and should be 
related to the specific financial sector conditions in the country under analysis. 
On the production layer, access to credit for producers in most developing countries is 
especially low in rural areas and for small scale enterprises. There is often an anti-
agriculture bias in the allocation of credit. Thus, producers’ size and location and the type 
of production are relevant for a sector’s access to credit. In analyzing the potential impact 
of financial constraints, access to credit has to be seen in relation to demand for external 
finance. A sector with high fixed upfront costs will tend to have a higher demand for ex-
ternal finance than a sector where variable costs are predominant. Such a sector will also 
need long term credit, which is usually more difficult to obtain than short term loans. The 
technology used for production has an impact on the costs of increasing output and thus 
impacts the need for investment finance. Production that is labor and land intensive can be 
expanded more easily without access to external finance than production that is capital 
intensive. Finally, potential substitutes for domestic credit have to be examined. A sector’s 
ability to attract investment inflows from other sources reduces its dependence on domes-
tic financial systems. This can occur through FDI, integration into global value chains, or 
the firm’s own ability to raise portfolio investment or get foreign loans. The presence of 
cooperatives, which provide investment goods such as seeds and fertilizers at subsidized 
prices or offer special financing schemes for input purchase can also mitigate producers’ 
demand for credit. Finally, firms with high profits or savings can rely on these resources 
and thus do not need to rely on credit to finance investment. 
On the transaction layer, the first and most important point of analysis is determining 
whether export structures for a given sector exist and if so, how they are organized. For 
example, a vertical export structure which is owned by a multinational company such as 
BAT’s export chain for tobacco from Uganda or PFC’s export chain for canned tuna from 
Ghana does not have to rely on the domestic financial sector at all. In such a case, finan-
cial constraints on the transaction layer will not be expected. On the other hand, domesti-
cally owned, horizontal export structures often involve many levels (small-scale buyers, 
domestic traders, exporters) which all have their individual financial needs. In this case, a 
sector’s export performance will depend strongly on the financial system’s ability to sat-
isfy each of these demands. In the case of non-traditional exports, export structures will 
often be inexistent or rudimentary. This will most likely raise the up-front costs associated 
with market creation and the development of relevant structures, and will thus further in-
crease the demand for external finance. The same holds true for high transport and com-
munication costs and a long time gap between production and payment. The amount of 
risk associated with an export sector, whether real or perceived, is relevant for determining 
the access to credit because banks are risk averse and thus prefer to make business with 
less risky clients even if others would be willing to pay a higher interest rate. 
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Box 1: Research matrix for sector and layer specific determinants of financial constraints 
Supply: 
Producers’ ability to respond to market  
opportunities arising from liberalization  
by increasing their output 
Question: Do financial constraints hinder the ability 
of producers in this sector to increase their output? 
Relevant factors for credit access: 
- type of production (agriculture,  
manufacturing, mining) 
- scale of production  
- location of production (urban, rural) 
Relevant factors for credit demand: 
- technology used 
- cost structure (fixed vs. variable) 
Potential substitutes for domestic credit 
- alternative sources of capital (FDI,  
global value chains, equity capital,  
foreign loans) 
- investment support agencies 
- high own profits or savings 
Transaction: 
The export good’s way from producers to buyers 
abroad including transport, market creation, and 
contact building with potential buyers, etc. 
Question: Do financial constraints hinder the trans-
action between producers and buyers in other coun-
tries? 
Relevant factors: 
- Existing export structures (efficiency  
and level of development, vertical  
or horizontal organization, state-run,  
private or foreign) 
- transport and telecommunication costs  
and availability 
- time gap between production and  
export payment 
- real and perceived sectoral risk (eg. tradi-
tional vs. non-traditional exports, price  
and production volatility) 
Competitiveness: 
The product’s ability to compete in export markets 
in terms of both price and quality 
 
Question: Do financial constraints hinder the com-
petitiveness of the product in international markets? 
Relevant factors for credit access: 
- type of production (agriculture,  
manufacturing, mining) 
- scale of production  
- location of production (urban, rural) 
Relevant factors for credit demand: 
- availability and cost of alternatives  
to the technology currently used 
Potential substitutes for domestic credit 
- alternative sources of capital (FDI, global 
value chains, equity capital, foreign loans)  
- investment support agencies 
- high own profits or savings 
Source: Author 
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On the competitiveness layer, access to credit and the availability of potential substitutes 
for domestic credit are determined by the same factors as on the production layer. The 
need for external finance is mainly determined by the costs of alternative production tech-
nologies. Although financial constraints on the competitiveness layer are thus character-
ized by factors similar to those on the production layer, the result is not necessarily the 
same. This is demonstrated in the case of non-traditional agricultural exports from Uganda 
where production was strongly increased through the cultivation of additional land. Ap-
parently, there was no financial constraint on the production layer because production 
could be increased with an increase in land and labor input rather than capital investment. 
However, exports soon stagnated and then began to decline because productivity in the 
sectors remained insufficient to compete on world markets. The case of Uganda also re-
veals that prices of export goods often become uncompetitive because of high transport 
costs including man-made barriers and poor infrastructure. Although external finance can 
help exporters deal with such up-front costs (on the transaction layer), the decision to re-
duce them and thus become more competitive (which would affect the competitiveness 
layer) is typically outside their control. This is clearly a task for the government. 
Using the above described matrix for all sectors relevant to a country’s future export per-
formance, one can identify where financial constraints are most likely to occur under trade 
liberalization. It should be noted that a sector can only perform well if constraints are tack-
led on all three layers. Also, the matrix gives an idea of how differences in access to ex-
ternal finance will impact the role different sectors can play in a country’s future export 
portfolio. Although this will of course also be determined by other factors such as the 
country’s comparative advantage, financial constraints can cause fundamental distortions 
by hindering the performance of potentially successful export sectors. 
The cases analyzed in this paper provide many examples of instruments countries have 
developed to tackle financial constraints under trade liberalization. These include micro 
credit schemes, investment support agencies, trade credit guarantee funds, and trade insur-
ance. It is beyond this paper’s scope to judge their individual efficiency, but it can be 
stated that many of these programs have led to encouraging results, demonstrating that 
financial constraints can be alleviated. The better these measures are targeted, the more 
efficient one can expect them to be. However, the case studies also show that most of 
these instruments were only adopted years after trade liberalization when financial bottle-
necks and their negative effect on export performance became so severe that they could no 
longer be ignored. In carrying out a research scheme based on the above described matrix, 
financial constraints can be identified and addressed at an earlier stage of trade liberaliza-
tion. This has two advantages. First, the efficiency of the measures adopted can be opti-
mized with respect to the export sectors’ particular financial needs under trade liberaliza-
tion. Second, in identifying and tackling potential financial constraints at an early point in 
the liberalization process, a country can avoid painful learning through bad experiences 
and thus reduce transaction costs and more quickly realize the benefits of liberalization. 
Identifying financial constraints under trade liberalization 
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